



Dabei	 avancierten	 ethnisch-kulturelle	 bzw.	 räumlich-rassische	 Metaphern	 sozialer	 Wünsch-





die	 In-/Exklusionschiffren	„weiß“	 und	„Europa“	 zu	 einem	 wanderungspolitischen	 Kulturogem	
konvergiert	–	und	erneut	von	einem	bio-areal	indifferenten	Paradigma	individueller	wirtschaft-
lich-sozialer	„Fitness“	überholt	worden.
It took Europe to make the Homo Europaeus. More specifically, it took the European 
political union to bring about a category of migrants that had not existed before: Eu-
ropeans. In the interplay of global flows and controls, it thus appears that classificatory 
power ultimately lies with the controllers.
Modern migratory regimes are institutional fabricates, designed by public authorities in 
order to register and administer large quantities of individual acts through categorizing 
and regulating them. Facing the amorphous phenomenon of human mobility, they strive 
for calculability and control – or at least an illusion of both. In doing so, authorities 
are inclined to construe tables of classifications that privilege institutional findings and 
institutionally generated knowledge over the (self-) perceptions, interpretations, and nar-
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ratives held by the classified themselves. In other words, confronted with the relatively 
unknown, with the outlandish in a literal sense, migratory regimes more often than 
not structure the world along the lines of political entities and circumstances on the 
one hand, and according to scientific assumptions on the other hand, which again are 
prone to reflect political-institutional contexts. While being potent, maybe prototypical 
machineries of ascription, at the same time, migratory regimes appear remarkably self-
referential.
It is this specific self-referentiality of the institutional sphere that underlies the circular 
structure of the argument I will present here. It comes down to the contention that 
“the European” as a recognized category in the sphere of North Atlantic migration only 
appeared as a consequence of the erection of “Europe” in terms of an institutionalized 
entity.
Yet, Homo Europaeus has a genealogy, albeit a shared one with other national and (post-
) imperial classes of migrants with whom he coexisted and continues to coexist in the 
realm of migratory regimes (As a matter of fact, such coexistence frequently takes place 
in one and the same agent). This essay intends to shed some light on this genealogy.
The (almost) open universe of ethnic indifference 
Up to the turn of the nineteenth century, early modern, mercantilist European states 
abhorred the loss of population and had put up legal and moral barriers on such acts of 
“desertion.”1 Thus, the “irruption into the Atlantic world of an under-populated repub-
lic that arrogated to itself an immense reserve of temperate lands – and determined to 
capitalize on this unique asset by marketing it to all comers – was a truly revolutionary 
event.”2 Indeed, Europeans considered the “routinized and accessible naturalization law” 
of the newly independent United States of America a breech of the law of nations.3
Originating in Britain only after the Napoleonic Wars, an ever growing, pauperized, and 
increasingly unruly population slowly turned the elites emigrationist, a process that was 
still fostered by a general turn towards economic liberalism. Over the following decades, 
much of Europe experienced an “Exit Revolution” (A. Zolberg), the successive elimina-
tion of restrictions to leave one’s country or territory of birth.4
At the same time, though, authorities in most countries continued to treat immigration 
largely in the way the early modern territorial state had approached its – or its neighbors’ 
– subjects. If at all, social and economic criteria like estate, profession, or income played a 
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criminal records or politically subversive activity provided reasons for expulsion.5 Ethnic-
ity, in contrast, only slowly grew from serving as a form of metaphor, or abbreviation, for 
concrete socio-political concerns – e.g., in the case of pauperized Irish in England 6– into 
an issue of its own, of national homogeneity, for instance the Poles in Germany.7
Basically the same tradition, yet modified and partially nationalized, can be observed in 
the administration of residence rights, expulsion, and according passport-systems that 
were developed in revolutionary France and soon spread elsewhere. The main idea was to 
single out political enemies, spies, and other subversive elements.8
Finally, a similar pattern of social evaluation ranking over cultural ascription charac-
terized US legal approaches towards migration. With the Naturalization Act of 1790 
conceding the right to naturalization to any “free white person” of “good character,”9 
attempts to restrict the immigration of undesirables became subject to a variety of federal 
and state legislations.10
Generally speaking, exclusion followed an assessment of individual properties, which 
targeted the (mentally) disabled, criminals, and those who seemed unable to support 
themselves; later professional beggars, polygamists, and anarchists were added to the 
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after quarantine and a restoration of health were rather common practice.12 Collective 
categories such as ethnicity, religion, or social background did not come into considera-
tion, at least not lawfully.
The act made manifest a line of exclusion that was repeatedly drawn and redrawn, which 
was negotiated in Europe, as well: that of race.13 Evidently, there is an early echo of “Eu-
rope” as a category of origin in this. Still, the accent here is on the fundamental divide 
between “free” and “un-free.” In the face of weak immigration from other parts of the 
world, the central idea was to deny slaves of generally African origin – as well as “native” 
Americans – naturalization as citizens. A ban on immigration was derived from this after 
the abolition of the slave trade; in 1808, slave states barred the entry of free blacks, while 
“free” states chose diverse regimes, from the protection to the exclusion of all people of 
African origin.14 Shortly after, legislation engaged the rights and acceptability of inden-
tured servants in general, including Europeans15, thus illustrating that the main concern 
was with liberty (and commercial relations) rather than with race. From this point of 
view, it appears only consistent that after the abolition of slavery, citizenship was granted 
to all those born on American soil (the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), and in 
1870, eligibility was extended to Africans in general.16 Following a comparable logic, 
Britain had allowed colonials to settle on the isle after its own ban on slavery in 1833.17
From Atlantic to Pacific Racism and back
If post-Civil War America turned towards “Atlantic Universalism,” it soon saw the inten-
sification of inhibitive policies towards Asian immigrants that then produced constric-
tions explicitly addressing racially or culturally defined collectives. At about the same 
time, European migratory regimes became increasingly dominated by the category of 
nation. The reason was twofold.
First, in most countries the state developed from an institution that primarily took (taxes, 
conscripts) into one that also gave, allotting civic, political, and social rights and entitle-
ments.18 The more such instruments of participation and inclusion on the supra-local 
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from the according provisions and who was not.19 It was less the system of migratory 
regimes in a narrower sense, which long remained comparatively liberal, or indifferent, 
but the problem of undesirable, mostly destitute individuals on the spot, from which a 
significant change in the administration of mobility originated.20 While self-dependent 
persons of means continued to enjoy relative freedom of movement, it was the develop-
ing national welfare state of the German Reich that began elevating nationality to the sta-
tus of a key category in practices of admission and expulsion. Between 1888 and 1906, 
international conventions codified the principle.21 According to these stipulations, an 
individual rejected elsewhere had to be admitted back into his or her country of origin. 
Respectively, any “foreigner” could be transferred to his “home” country.22 Moreover, it 
was this order of re-admission, in contrast to the older practice of expulsion over just 
any border,23 which rendered national affiliation key in the classification of the mobile 
population24 – and an oft-contested one. Intense research and prolonged struggles over 
the national identity of an undesired migrant, and thus over the responsibility for sup-
porting him, became a widespread phenomenon.25
To put the rule to the test, the Habsburg Empire is a case where welfare remained a strict-
ly municipal, or local, function. Here, needy migrants were addressed as non-eligible 
“strangers” (Fremde) without further classification or regard for their territorial origin. 
Only in the “constitutional” period of the 1860s, with widening political rights, were 
attempts made to define and restrict the rights of alien residents – without any consist-
ent legislative result. The tense multiethnic situation of the empire suggested to leave the 
issue pending, all the more as the monarchy did not experience large-scale immigration 
anyway.26
This leads to the second and more obvious reason for the rise of ethnic or racial catego-
ries in the structure of migratory regimes: a general expansion of migration flows, their 
gradual interweavement into a globally interdependent system, and a corresponding in-
crease in the heterogeneity of regions of origin. 
Up to the 1860s, immigration to the USA had its source mainly in North Western and 
German speaking Europe, which supplied ninety-five percent of the new arrivals be-
tween 1851 and 1860. By the first decade of the twentieth century, though, their share 
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nated the statistics were the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe (Italy, the Habsburg 
Monarchy, Russia, and also Spain and Portugal), and notably China.28 As a matter of 
fact, it was Chinese immigration that provoked a change in the US migratory regime 
over the latter decades of the century, soon affecting migrants from other parts of the 
world, and namely from Europe.29
If post Civil War legislation conceded naturalization rights to all those born on US soil 
and quickly extended the option to immigrants from Africa, the same law generally 
denied such rights to those arriving from Asia.30 In 1882, the “Chinese Exclusion Act” 
banned the entry of Chinese contract laborers, and in 1885, the law was extended to 
exclude all “un-free” work and toilers irrespective of their origin.31 Thus, the underlying 
pattern of racial exclusion at first remained untouched: The motivating argument behind 
the anti-Chinese reformulation of the migratory regime was provided and propagated 
by early trade union campaigns, which undertook to fend off the transpacific influx 
of cheap labor, stressing its un-free character. The “coolie trade,” or so the argument 
ran, operated under conditions that resembled those of the just abolished slave system, 
threatening American “free labor.”32
Cultural, racial and juridical allegations were amalgamated to a degree that let “non-
white” and “un-free” appear almost congruent – albeit such semantics were neither cov-
ered by the reality of Chinese work migration,33 nor were they consistent with that of 
emancipated “black” African Americans.34
Nonetheless, Chinese became associated with imaginations of dependency, closely linked 
to those of cultural inferiority, and specifically of a devious, effeminate collective char-
acter.35 “A distinct and antagonistic race,”36 they were marked as Un-American and, 
what is more, as inaccessible to Americanization. At the hands of Chinese migrants, 
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mechanisms aimed at the exclusion of whole ethnically and culturally defined groups as 
“unfit for America.”37
Yet, the racially charged Sinophobe discourses, legislation, and practices induced by no 
means the construction of (desirable) “Europeans” ex negativo. On the contrary, “white” 
was incongruent with “European,” and “color” proved to be a quite shaded concept.38
Donna Gabaccia has shown this in a striking manner for the case of the Italians, whose 
experience soon was to be shared by other groups of immigrants.39 Exclusionist legisla-
tion on “yellow” Chinese “coolies” was only just established when the supposedly equally, 
or almost equally, “un-free” Italian migrants, suffering from adhesion contracts and ex-
erting pressure on wages, fell to stigmatizations as “swarthy,” or “olive” and ultimately to 
the pointed verdict that they represent “the Chinese of Europe.”40
Thus, the concept of “European” in these debates on immigration to the United States 
is at best an implicit and normative one. If “Europeans” ideally were “free” and “white,” 
or used to be, they now proved in large numbers not to be – that is, organized interest 
and discourses of self-affirmation came to represent it that way. Incongruent with an 
assumed “fitness for America,” the category of “European” could not serve to define the 
US migratory regime.
Instead, legislative experience with the exclusion of an ethnically defined collective that 
was perceived as economic competition41 and successfully was marked as “distinct” and 
“antagonistic” towards US-nativist self-assumptions,42 stimulated attempts to close the 
door for other groups whose profile of origin differed from that of the bulk of earlier im-
migrants, as well.43 Southern and Eastern Europeans, and among these, specifically Jews 
were the major targets.44 According legislation passed through Congress first in 1896, 
but was blocked by presidential veto until 1917.45
Yet, just as the Chinese Exclusion Act – albeit named tellingly enough – did not pri-
marily rely on its ethnical content but drew on concepts of “free” and “un-free” labor, 
it was now literacy that was to serve the purpose. The bill envisioned a reading test to 
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populations could be expected to fail, implying the desired ethno-regional exclusion.46 
When the law finally was enacted at the end of World War I, with transatlantic migra-
tion picking up again, it showed itself impotent due to exceptions providing for family 
reunions, but mostly since educational standards in the targeted areas had significantly 
improved.47
Only then, among an atmosphere of Red Scare and massive nativist reaction against 
“non-whites” (and non-protestants), generally against the backdrop of an increasingly 
aggressive mood towards various deviances from a narrowly contoured set of normative 
WASP style concepts,48 did ethnic restriction come forward to articulate its goals bluntly 
and extensively. From 1921/24 onward, the law commanded Asians to be rejected al-
together and Europeans to be permitted only according to a quota system that in the 
long run would allow reestablishing the US society’s ethnic composition before the latest 
“wave” of immigration.49
The basis upon which the necessary classification rested, and which instructed the quota 
system of the 1920s, was a “list of races and peoples”50 that had served since 1898 to 
gather statistical information on immigration to the US. Before, only the country of 
origin had been asked to be reported,51 which often was a multinational empire. Thus, 
seemingly grave misinterpretations had come to light, e. g., in a number of 40,000 im-
migrants from Russia in 1898, only 200 proved to be “actual” Russians, the vast majority 
declared themselves Jews or Poles.52
This enlightening list strongly reminds one of the “Chinese Encyclopedia” famously 
quoted by Jorge Luis Borges.53 It contained among other the ascriptions: African (black), 
Armenian, Bohemian, Moravian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Chinese, Croatian 
and Slovenian, Cuban, Dalmatian, Bosnian and Herzegovian, Dutch and Flemish, East 
Indian, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Irish, Italian (North), Italian 
(South), Japanese, Korean, Lithuanan, Magyar, Mexican, Pacific Islander, Polish, Portu-
guese, Russian, Ruthenian (Russnik), Scandinavian (Norwegians, Danes and Swedes), 
Scottish, and Welsh.54 What is of interest here is less the intriguing mixture of politi-
cal, geographical, lingual, confessional, biological and other criteria and assumptions 
the list reflects, nor its alternation of keen attention for the slightest differentials with 
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made US officials fabricate their 1898 racial map of the globe.55 What is of relevance for 
the argument here is the fact that when US immigration authorities began to construe 
and employ categories of ethno-cultural belonging, the “free white person” of 1790 did 
not at all evolve into a Homo Europaeus but rather was disassembled into innumerous 
subgroups of “races and peoples”; the most obvious privilege was their elaborate division 
into incomparably smaller segments than the “rest of the world” could hope to be hier-
archically organized along.
The quotas established in 1921/24 were about ethno-cultural hierarchic ordering. They 
translated the 1898 catalogue into a rank of desirability, with North Western Europeans 
first, limited numbers of East and South Europeans grudgingly accepted, and Asians had 
the door slammed on them.56
As time went by, political circumstances induced the introduction of Latvian, Estoni-
an, and Albanian “races” in 1936, as well as the belated unification of “Southern” and 
“Northern” Italy by US immigration authorities “with respect to the Italian people,” that 
is, to Mussolini.57 “African (black)” became “Negro” since the majority of the individuals 
in question arrived from the West Indies. Pressure by the Mexican government brought 
their co-nationals into the meta category “white”; analogous efforts from lobby groups 
earned the Celtic “race” of the Manx special mentioning, while in 1943 this same cat-
egory with regard to the Jews was abolished – after years of fruitless protest against such 
irreverence of context or conversion.58 At that point, the corresponding report came to 
acknowledge that “scientists are in hopeless confusion and contradiction as to the criteria 
of race.”59
Still, it took another twenty years before the ethno-racial ranking of US immigrants was 
dropped. In 1965, the gargantuan list was replaced by a migratory regime that – again 
– rewarded individual properties.60 By then, migration control in the Old World was 
entering an era of categorical change, too.
Races, Nations, and Empires
Just like in the United States, Sino-obsession rose to prominence in late nineteenth cen-
tury European reactions to modern mobility. Yet, while English xenophobes during the 
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iens,”61 German estate owners, in 1895, explicitly suggested recruiting Chinese seasonal 
toilers – with reactions by German unions similar to those of organized labor across the 
Atlantic.62
No more than was the case in America, neither controversy simply produced a binary 
understanding of “Yellow Peril” vs. “European Civilization,” let alone according migra-
tory regimes. Instead, the background for suggestions to bring “coolies” to Germany 
was provided by distinct anti-Polish resentments.63 Also, Prussian and Whig exclusion-
ism equally focused on Galician and Russian Jews, differing from patterns of Chinese-
bashing slightly at best.64 In England, “Jew” and “immigrant” came close to being used 
as synonyms, leaving behind even the time-honored despise for the nominally British 
Irish.65
In another parallel to US practices, late nineteenth century French scholars drew up 
a catalogue of ethnic hierarchy to structure the migratory regime.66 Obviously, in this 
incident the intention was not so much to (re-)stabilize the ethnic composition of the 
nation. Rather, the classification relied on blood groups and their compatibility and 
paid particular attention to the various groups’ faculty to assimilate into the job market. 
The resulting gradient was quite similar to that of the American racial map: It ran from 
North West to South East across the European continent and beyond, assembling on 
the lowest rungs of desirability Jews, Eastern Slavs, Armenians, and Africans. In contrast 
to the United States, though, this order of peoples never materialized into legislation. 
After decades of controversy in changing political contexts, liberated France in 1945 
ultimately implemented a racially egalitarian migratory regime – twenty years before the 
US swung back into the same path.
The one thing all these regulatory attempts – or their mentioned absence as in the case 
of the Habsburg Empire until its downfall in 1918 –, failed or successful, had in com-
mon, was that they did not conceive a positively defined Homo Europaeus. The idea of an 
overarching “white race” was indeed widely spread and so were assumptions of its almost 
self evident superiority. But by far, not all Europeans were treated as fully-fledged “white” 
in this normative sense. The geographical and historical idea of “Europe” had no distinct 
and coherent equivalent in terms of ethnic or social imagination primarily because it was 
lacking a political and institutional distinction.
Larger-than-nation political structures, though, did exist in the form of the European 
colonial empires, and respective post-colonial spaces and organizations. These did have 
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and the North of the continent irrevocably and on a large scale changed from sending 
to predominantly receiving societies after World War II.67 In Britain, this led to the di-
vorce of the Commonwealth citizenship from unhindered mobility in 196168, undoing 
the long standing freedom of residence established across the empire in 1833 following 
the abolition of slavery.69 A complex interplay of restrictions and privileges concerning 
rights of entry and settlement, to welfare and integration programs, and of integration 
and exclusion came to characterize the migratory regimes of most (post-) imperial nation 
states with regard to the populations of their actual or former colonies.70 This holds true 
for countries that over time developed shortages of labor, like Britain, France, and the 
Netherlands, but also for the sending societies of Portugal and Spain, and remnants of 
this historical legacy remain in effect to date.71
At the same time, these countries, but also nations without – accessible – post-imperial 
supplementary areas, such as Germany, concluded recruitment contracts with partners 
mainly around the Mediterranean basin to fill labor shortages. As a rule, such agreements 
were bilateral,72 while the scope of partners was not limited to what geographically or 
culturally was then commonly perceived as Europe. Rather, they reached beyond South-
ern Europe to North Africa as well as to various regions of the Near East and East Asia.73 
Again, these specific migratory regimes did not operate with the category of a European 
man. 
Homo Europaeus
The Europeanization of Europe set in just about when the European overseas empires 
faced accelerating decolonization. In this context, “Europeanization” alludes less to the 
thesis of a “continually shrinking influence of national governments,”74 but rather refers 
to the emergence of the European Community as an institutional entity and thereby as 
a player of potential relevance in migration politics.
The first step was made by the European Economic Community, founded in 1957, when 
in 1961 its members – France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxem-
burg – agreed to grant their citizens general freedom of movement within each other’s 
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tinental mobility from a legal point of view into internal migration.76 More specifically, 
the Single European Act of 198677, and the Maastricht Treaty that took effect on Janu-
ary 1, 1994, have provided the framework for unrestricted mobility within the Union78 
– temporary curtails and delay clauses notwithstanding, which accompanied the “eastern 
enlargements” since 200479, in particular. The Maastricht Treaty also created a European 
citizenship by according all member state citizens – and only them – a certain set of 
rights, including free choice of residence, suffrage in local and European elections at the 
place of residence, diplomatic protection in third countries, and the right to petition to 
the European Parliament.80
Yet, one issue the treaty neglected, or codified to the lowest possible degree, was the 
competence of European authorities over regulations concerning the immigration of 
non-EU nationals into the union, that is, its member states.81 Nonetheless, the common 
institutions over the following decade managed to pass a number of acts that bind the 
nation states in this concern. On the one hand, it soon became manifest that a zone of 
unrestricted mobility with a common external border runs into functional difficulty if no 
provisions are set for who is to have access to this zone and which rights and entitlements 
they receive within. On the other hand, national governments realized that the partial 
Europeanization actually accommodated their increasingly restrictive purposes.82 As a 
consequence, the constitutional project of the later 2000s envisaged a further delegation 
of authority over the migratory regime to the common institutions, even though a clause 
carried by Germany reserves every national government’s right to legislate a general cap 
on immigration into its territory.83
Thus, the EU-27 countries differentiate between national citizens, EU citizens, and third 
state nationals, with the civic and political84 rights and entitlements of the latter vary-
ing strongly from country to country.85 Similarly, national concepts of citizenship and 
naturalization practices remain strongly heterogeneous.86 Last but not least, this is the 
	 Ibid.,	pp.	–8.
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realm in which diverse imperial or quasi-imperial pasts display a long afterlife, e. g., in 
the form of facilitated naturalization for German Spätaussiedler, or repatriates from the 
East European German speaking minorities, for Filipinos, Equatorial-Guineans and oth-
ers in Spain, or for PALOP87-nationals in Portugal.88
However, those reverberations of the past appear to be phasing out. More or less in 
parallel to their opening up for “Europeans,” most post-colonial centers gradually have 
adopted more restrictionist, or even exclusivist migratory regimes towards the former 
imperial peripheries. Regardless of the persisting differences, there is one distinction that 
has gained thorough acceptance throughout the Union’s legislatures: that between “Eu-
ropeans” and Extracomunitari89 (non-EU immigrants). In other words, synchronously 
to the reduction of the European empires European migratory regimes finally brought 
about Homo Europaeus. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that his habitat is 
politically limited to the local and supranational level, while in national affairs, even a 
European foreigner remains just a foreigner. 
Another somewhat ironic aspect of this turn of the Europeans towards themselves is 
that at the very moment they started creating Homo Europaeus migrans, their historical 
counterpart in negotiations over access classifications dropped the approach of ethnic 
or origin criteria altogether. As aforementioned, in 1965 the USA chose to implement 
a migratory regime based on individual properties so that the category of European in 
terms of migration remains limited to one side of the North Atlantic (travel and visa 
regulations render a different picture, of course).
Even with regard to the European continent, the concept is de facto and by no means 
wholeheartedly inclusivist. There always has been, and continues to be, the hierarchy 
of access between EC / EU insiders and other continentals. More tellingly, and some-
what reminding of the earlier shades of “whiteness,” negotiations over enlargement since 
1989/90 have carried strong ethnocentric, if not openly racist undertones that still linger 
in the delay of full freedom of mobility for East European member-state citizens – let 
alone non-member state nationals – and that are awkwardly manifest in the debate over a 
possible admission of Turkey. Not accidentally, this struggle over membership, affiliation, 
or outright exclusion is centered on prospective migrant flows. At its core, the discussion 
is on whose mobility deserves warm approval as free internal migration, and whose entry 
ought be blocked to prevent culturally “foreign” infiltration. Thus, the migratory regime 
definition of who is, or can be, a European – who is culturally “fit for Europe,” to take 
up the early twentieth-century American phrase – has seized a constitutive place in the 
fabrication of European identity. If Homo Europaeus is a result of political Europe, the 
self-interpretation of the supra-national community proves highly dependent on the eth-
nic profile of this new figure in the world of migratory regimes. The legacy of the White 
Man is still with us in his descendant.
8	 “Países	Africanos	de	Língua	Oficial	Portuguesa”,	or	“Portuguese-Speaking	African	Countries”.
88	 Gropas	/Triandafyllidou,	Concluding	Remarks,	p.	33.
89	 Gropas	/Triandafyllidou/Vogel,	Introduction,	p.	.
